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Abstract
Empirical evidence from sequential auctions shows that prices of identical goods tend to
decline between rounds. In this paper, I show how expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences and loss aversion can rationalize this phenomenon. I analyze two-round sealed-
bid auctions with symmetric bidders having independent private values and unit demand.
Equilibrium bids in the second round are history-dependent and subject to a discour-
agement e¤ect: the higher the winning bid in the rst auction is, the less aggressive the
behavior of the remaining bidders in the second auction. When choosing his strategy in
the rst round, however, a bidder conditions his bid on being pivotal and hence expects not
to be discouraged. Equilibrium behavior, therefore, leads the winner of the rst round to
overestimate the bid of his highest opponent and hence the next-round price so that equilib-
rium prices decline. Moreover, sequential and simultaneous auctions are not bidder-payo¤
equivalent nor revenue equivalent.
JEL classication: D03; D44; D81; D82.
Keywords: Reference-Dependent Preferences; Loss Aversion; Sequential Auctions;
Afternoon E¤ect.
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1 Introduction
Sequential auctions are often used to sell multiple lots of the same or similar goods. How
should one expect prices to vary from one round to the next? Weber (1983) and Milgrom and
Weber (2000) showed that with symmetric, risk-neutral, unit-demand bidders having indepen-
dent private values, the law of one price should hold and on average prices should be the same
across di¤erent rounds. Intuitively, if they were not, then demand from the rounds with a higher
expected price would shift towards those rounds with a lower expected price, due to arbitrage
opportunities. To see why, consider a two-round second-price auction. In the last round, all
bidders still participating in the auction will bid their valuations since this is a weakly-dominant
strategy. In the rst round, it is optimal for bidders to shade their bids to account for the option
value of participating in the second round. Bidders with a higher valuation also have a higher
option value and, therefore, they shade their bids by a greater amount than do bidders with a
lower valuation. In the second round, the number of bidders is lower, but the number of objects
is lower as well. The rst fact has a negative e¤ect on the competition for an object while the
second one has a positive e¤ect. Remarkably, in equilibrium these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each
other. As a result, all gains to waiting are arbitraged away and the expected prices in both
rounds are the same. The intuition for this result is very general, holds also for more than two
rounds and does not depend on the specic type of auction.1
However, this neat theoretical result does not seem to be supported by the data. Ashen-
felter (1989), McAfee and Vincent (1993) and Ginsburgh (1998) document a puzzling declining
price anomaly or afternoon e¤ect (reecting that later auctions often take place in the after-
noon whereas earlier ones are in the morning) in sequential auctions for identical bottles of
wine. Declining price patterns have been also found by Beggs and Graddy (1997) for artwork,
Ashenfelter and Genesove (1992) for condominiums, Van den Berg et al. (2001) for owers and
Lambson and Thurston (2006) for fur. There is also experimental evidence of declining prices
in sequential auctions; see Keser and Olson (1996), Février et al. (2007) and Neugebauer and
Pezanis-Christou (2007). Moreover, while declining prices are more frequent, increasing prices
have also been documented; see, for example, Chanel et al. (1996), Gandal (1997) and Deltas
and Kosmopoulou (2004).2 It is quite an interesting result that, in a variety of di¤erent types
of auctions, price direction throughout an auction can be predicted. Declining prices have been
documented in more instances than rising prices have. Declining prices do not occur in every
auction, but they seem to be an empirically robust feature of sequential auctions.
1Technically, with independent private values, the price sequence of any standard auction is a martingale, so
that the expected price in round k + 1, conditional on pk, the price in round k, is equal to pk.
2Milgrom and Weber (2000) showed that if bidderssignals are a¢ liated and values are interdependent, then
the equilibrium price sequence is a sub-martingale and the expected value of pk+1, conditional on pk, is higher
than pk. Mezzetti (2011) showed that a¢ liated signals are not necessary to explain increasing-price sequences:
interdependent values with informational externalities  that is, when a bidders value is increasing in all bidders
private signals  even with independent signals, push prices to increase between rounds.
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In this paper, I study two-round sealed-bid auctions with symmetric bidders having indepen-
dent private values and unit demand and I argue that reference-dependent preferences and loss
aversion provide an explanation for the afternoon e¤ect. More generally, I show that reference-
dependent preferences with expectations as the reference point induce an endogenous form of
interdependence in the bidderspayo¤s even though values are private and independent. Indeed,
the derivation of the equilibrium strategies resembles that of the standard reference-free model
with interdependent (common) values. The reason is that even though a bidders valuation does
not depend directly on his competitorstypes, these a¤ect the likelihood of him winning the
auction and hence his reference point.
Section 2 introduces the model of bidderspreferences and the solution concept. Following
Köszegi and Rabin (2006), I assume that in addition to classical consumption utility, a bidder
also derives gain-loss utility from the comparison of his consumption to a reference point equal to
his lagged expectations regarding the same outcomes, with losses being more painful than equal-
sized gains are pleasant. To account for the intrinsic dynamic nature of sequential auctions, I
develop a dynamic version of the Choice Acclimating Personal Equilibrium (CPE) introduced
in Köszegi and Rabin (2007) that I call Sequential Choice Acclimating Personal Equilibrium
(SCPE). In a SCPE, a decision maker correctly predicts his (possibly stochastic) strategy at
each point in the future, folds-back the game tree using backward induction, and then applies
the same (static) CPE as in Köszegi and Rabin (2007) at every stage of the game.3
Sections 3 and 4 analyze sequential rst-price and second-price auctions, respectively. First,
I show that expectations-based reference-dependent preferences create an informational exter-
nality that renders equilibrium bids history-dependent, even if bidders have independent private
values. Intuitively, learning the outcome of the previous auction modies a bidders expectations
about how likely he is to win in the current one. Since expectations are the reference point,
the optimal bid in the second auction depends also on what a bidder learns from the rst one
as this modies his reference point. More precisely, I identify what I call the discouragement
e¤ect : the higher the winning bid in the rst auction is, the less aggressive the bidding strategy
of the remaining bidders in the second auction. The intuition is that, from the point of view of
a bidder who lost the rst auction, the higher the type of the winner is, the less likely he is to
win in the second one; this in turn lowers the bidders reference point who does not feel a strong
attachment to the item and therefore reduces his equilibrium bid.
Notice that the history dependence arising in my model has the opposite e¤ect of the one
stemming from interdependent (common) values. With interdependent values, since in equilib-
rium he conditions his bid on himself having the highest signal, if a bidder loses the current
3The original notion of CPE in Köszegi and Rabin (2007) is related to the models of disappointment aversion
of Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986), and Gul (1991), where outcomes are also evaluated relative to a
reference lottery that is identical to the chosen lottery; likewise the notion of SCPE introduced in this paper is
related to the notion of dynamic disappointment aversion proposed in Artstein-Avidan and Dillenberger (2011).
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auction he learns that the winner had a higher signal than his; this in turn makes a losing bidder
revise his estimate of the value of the good upward and therefore he will bid more aggressively
in subsequent auctions. The discouragement e¤ect instead goes in the opposite direction by
pushing bidders to bid less aggressively in later rounds.
When choosing his bid in the rst round, however, a bidder conditions his bid on himself
having the highest type and hence expects not to be discouraged. Indeed, in the rst round it
is optimal for a bidder to bid up to a point where he is indi¤erent between barely winning in
the current round (by being tied with his strongest opponent) and winning in the next round.
However, ex-post the winner never barely wins. Equilibrium behavior, therefore, leads the winner
of the rst round to overestimate the bid of his highest opponent and hence the next-round price
so that equilibrium prices tend to decline.
With risk-neutral bidders having independent private values, sequential and simultaneous
auctions are revenue-equivalent for the seller and payo¤-equivalent for the bidders. In Section 5
I show that these equivalences break down if bidders are expectations-based loss-averse. The key
di¤erence between sequential and simultaneous auctions is the timing of information. Sequential
auctions provide bidders, in between rounds, with the opportunity to update their beliefs about
the intensity of competition. Such feedback, however, is absent in simultaneous auctions. In
the classical model this di¤erence is irrelevant since bidding strategies in sequential auctions
are history-independent. Loss-averse bidders, instead, update their reference point based on the
outcome of the previous round. I show that bidders with high (resp. low) values prefer sequential
(simultaneous) auctions since they are more likely to receive good (bad) news between rounds.
Furthermore, sequential auctions generate a higher (resp. lower) revenue than simultaneous ones
when the number of bidders is large (small).
For most of the paper, when dealing with sequential sealed-bid auctions, I assume that the
winning bid in the rst round is publicly announced by the seller prior to the second round. This
assumption is inconsequential in the classical reference-free model when bidders have indepen-
dent private values, but it is not when bidders have reference-dependent preferences. Therefore,
in Section 6 I analyze sequential auctions with no bid announcement and I show that the equi-
librium strategies are radically di¤erent. If the winning bid from the rst round is not publicly
revealed, a losing bidder must use his own past bid to update his expectations about how likely
he is to win in the second one. As auctions without bid announcement provide them with a
noisier feedback mechanism, thus exposing them to greater risk, loss-averse bidders react by
bidding less aggressively so that the sellers expected revenue decreases. Nevertheless, the af-
ternoon e¤ect still arises in equilibrium. The reason, in this case, is that bidders are willing to
pay a premium in the rst round in order to avoid having to go to the second round and being
discouraged.
Many di¤erent explanations for the afternoon e¤ect have been proposed. Ashenfelter (1989)
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hypothesized risk aversion as a plausible explanation for the declining-price pattern. However,
McAfee and Vincent (1993) argue that risk aversion is not a convincing explanation. They
studied two-round rst-price and second-price auctions with independent private values, and
showed that equilibrium prices decline only if bidders display increasing absolute risk aversion.
Under the more plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, a monotone symmetric
pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist and prices need not decline. Black and De Meza (1992)
and Février et al. (2005) argue that declining prices are no anomaly if the winning bidder in one
auction is allowed to purchase all subsequent lots at the same price.4 Bernhardt and Scoones
(1994), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) and Gale and Hausch (1994) consider sequential auctions
of stochastically equivalentobjects  that is, when each biddersvaluations are identically
distributed across the objects, but are not perfectly correlated  and show that in this case
equilibrium bidding implies declining prices. Eyster (2002) models the behavior of an agent who
has a taste for rationalizing past actions by taking current actions for which those past actions
were optimal. He shows that this taste for consistency gives rise to an unsunk-cost fallacythat
can rationalize declining prices in sequential English auctions. Other studies have emphasized
demand complementarity (Menezes and Monteiro, 2003), supply uncertainty (Jeitschko, 1999),
order-of-sale e¤ects (Chakraborty et al., 2006) and budget constraints (Pitchick and Schotter,
1988) in accounting for the declining price anomaly.
More recently, Mezzetti (2011) introduced a special case of risk aversion, called aversion
to price risk, according to which a bidder prefers to win an object at a certain price rather
than at a random price with the same expected value.5 Under this di¤erent notion of risk
aversion, in sequential auctions with independent private values a monotone equilibrium in pure
strategies always exists and in equilibrium prices decline. Although aversion to price risk and
loss aversion are both able to explain the afternoon e¤ect, the intuition behind the result is quite
di¤erent. In Mezzetti (2011), the afternoon e¤ect is due to the biddersdislike of uncertainty over
money; in my model, instead, the afternoon e¤ect arises because bidders dislike uncertainty over
consumption. The di¤erent intuition translates also into di¤erent testable predictions. When
bidders are averse to price risk, the equilibrium strategies do not depend on the history of the
game and therefore the sellers information revelation policy does not a¤ect revenue; with loss
aversion, instead, biddersstrategies are history-dependent and the seller is always better o¤ by
committing to publicly reveal the history of the winning bids.
Section 7 concludes the paper by recapping the results of the model and pointing out some
of its limitations as well as possible avenues for future research. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.
4However, Ashenfelter (1989) nds declining prices also for the case of bidders with unit demand.
5Similarly to the model of reference-dependent preferences of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), Mezzettis notion of
aversion to price risk assumes separability of a bidders payo¤ between the utility from winning the object and
the disutility from paying the price.
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2 Model
2.1 Environment
Suppose 2 identical items are sold to N > 2 bidders via a series of sealed-bid auctions. More
specically, one item is sold using a sealed-bid auction and the winning bid is publicly announced;
then, the remaining item is sold using a sealed-bid auction. Announcing the winning bid from
former auctions prior to the current one is in accord with government procurement statutes and
with actual practice in some auctions.
I assume bidders want at most one unit and have independent private values. Each bidders
valuation (type) i is drawn independently from the same distribution F with continuous positive
density f everywhere on the support
h
0; 
i
. I will consider two types of games. In the rst one,
the goods are sold sequentially via a series of rst-price auctions. In the second one, the goods
are sold sequentially via a series of second-price auctions. Both auctions have a zero reserve
price. Throughout the paper, I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in pure and (strictly)
monotone strategies.6 It is convenient to think of the auctions as being held in di¤erent periods
of the day, the rst one in the morning and the second one in the afternoon; however I assume
the auctions are held in a short enough time so that bidders do not discount payo¤s from the
second auction.
2.2 BiddersPreferences
Bidders have expectations-based reference-dependent preferences as formulated by Köszegi
and Rabin (2006). In this formulation, a bidders utility function has two components. First, if he
wins the auction at price p, a type- bidder experiences consumption utility  p. Consumption
utility can be thought of as the classical notion of outcome-based utility. Second, the bidder also
derives utility from the comparison of his actual consumption to a reference point given by his
recent expectations (probabilistic beliefs).7 Slightly departing from the original model of Köszegi
and Rabin (2006), I assume that bidders have reference-dependent preferences only with respect
to their valuation for the item, but not with respect to the price they might pay; in other words,
bidders are risk neutral over money. Although restrictive, this assumption is reasonable when
bidders income is already subject to large background risk as argued by Köszegi and Rabin
(2009). Relatedly, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) propose that money given up in purchases
6In a symmetric equilibrium, the nal allocation is e¢ cient: the rst good will go to the bidder with the
highest value and the second one to the bidder with the second-highest value.
7Recent experimental evidence lends support to Köszegi and Rabins (2006) expectations-based model of
reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion; see, for instance, Abeler et al. (2011), Ericson and Fuster
(2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), Karle et al. (forthcoming) and Sprenger (2011). More pertinently, Banerji and
Gupta (2014), Eisenhuth and Ewers (2012) and Ratan (2013) provide experimental evidence supporting the
model of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) in the context of sealed-bid auctions.
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is not generally subject to loss aversion. Hence, for a riskless consumption outcome (; p) and
riskless reference point r, a bidders total utility is given by
U
h
(; p) j

r
i
=    p+ 

   r

(1)
where
 (x) =
8<: x if x  0x if x < 0
is gain-loss utility, with  > 0 and  > 1. The parameter  captures the relative weight a
consumer attaches to gain-loss utility while  is the coe¢ cient of loss aversion.
Because in many situations expectations are stochastic, Köszegi and Rabin (2006) extend
the utility function in (1) to allow for the reference point to be a probability distribution H. In
this case a consumers overall utility from the outcome (; p) can be written as
U [(; p) jH] =    p+
Z
r


   r

dH (2)
In words, a bidder compares the realized consumption outcome with each possible outcome
in the reference lottery. For example, if he expected to win the auction with probability q, then
winning the auction feels like a gain of  (1  q) while losing the auction results in a loss of q.
Thus, the weight on the loss (gain) in the overall experience is equal to the probability with
which he was expecting to win (lose) the auction.
2.3 Solution Concept
Each bidder learns his valuation before submitting his bids and, therefore, maximizes his
interim expected utility. If the distribution of the reference point is H and the distribution of
consumption outcomes is G, a type- bidders interim expected utility is given by
EU [GjH] =
Z
f;pg
Z
frg U
h
(; p) jr
i
dHdG:
For each auction in which he participates, after placing a bid, a bidder basically faces a
lottery between winning or losing the auction and the probabilities and potential payo¤s depend
on his own as well as other playersbids. The nal outcome is then evaluated with respect
to any possible outcome from this lottery as a reference point. As laid out in Köszegi and
Rabin (2007), Choice Acclimating Personal Equilibrium (CPE) is the most appropriate solution
concept for such decisions under risk when uncertainty is resolved after the decision is made so
that the decision makers strategy determines the distribution of the reference point as well as
the distribution of nal consumption outcomes; that is, H = G.
A strategy for bidder i is a pair of bidding functions i = (1; 2), one for each auction.
6
Fixing all other biddersstrategies,  i, bidder is strategy i induces a distribution over the
set of nal consumption outcomes. For k = 1; 2, let  k

i; i

denote the distribution over
nal consumption outcomes from auction k point of view. Similarly, let EUk denote a bidder
expected utility from auction k point of view if he plans to bid according to i and expects
his rivals to bid according to  i. To account for the intrinsic dynamic nature of sequential
auctions, I introduce a slightly modied version of CPE.
Denition 1. A strategy prole  constitutes a Sequential Choice Acclimating Personal Equi-
librium (SCPE) if for all i, and for k = 1; 2:
EUk
h
i ; 

 ij k

i ; 

 i
i
 EUk
hei;  ij k ei;  ii
for any ei 6= i .
In words, in a SCPE a bidder correctly predicts his (possibly stochastic) strategy at each
point in the future, then folds-back the game tree using backward induction and applies the same
(static) CPE as in Köszegi and Rabin (2007) at every stage of the game. Notice that, at stage
k, a bidders reference point is given by his stage-k expectations,  k

i ; 

 i

, about his nal
consumption at the end of all auctions. Furthermore, in the second round bidders update their
reference point based on the outcome of the rst round.8 The following assumption, maintained
for the remainder of the paper, guarantees that all bidders participate in the auction for any
realization of their own type, and that the equilibrium bidding functions derived in the next
sections are strictly increasing:
Assumption 1 (No dominance of gain-loss utility)    (  1)  1:
This assumption places, for a given  (), an upper bound on  () and ensures that an
agents equilibrium expected utility is increasing in his type.9 What it requires is that the
weight a bidder places on expected gain-loss utility does not (strictly) exceed the weight he puts
on consumption utility. Finally, notice that risk neutrality is embedded in the model as a special
case (for either  = 0 or  = 1).
8The concept of SCPE introduced in this paper coincides with a special case of the dynamic version of
Preferred Personal Equilibrium (PPE ) introduced by Köszegi and Rabin (2009). In their dynamic model, people
have a reference point for every period in which they expects to consume  so that consumption levels in di¤erent
periods are treated like di¤erent dimensions  and are loss-averse over changes in beliefs about present as well
future consumption. If consumption takes place only in the last period and the weight on prospective gain-loss
utility (or newsutility) is equal to 1, my solution concept is equivalent to theirs.
9Herweg et al. (2010) rst introduced Assumption 1 and referred to it as no dominance of gain-loss utility.
Assumption 1 has been used also by Lange and Ratan (2010), Eisenhuth (2012) and Eisenhuth and Ewers (2012).
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3 First-price Auctions
Consider a situation in which two identical items are sold sequentially via rst-price auctions.
In this case, a symmetric equilibrium consists of two bidding functions (1; 2), one for each
auction. I assume that both functions are strictly increasing and di¤erentiable. The rst-round
bidding strategy is a function 1 :
h
0; 
i
! R+ that depends only on the bidders type. The bid
in the second auction, instead, might depend also on the price paid in the rst auction. Since
we are focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, it is useful to take the point of view of one of the
bidders, say bidder i with type i and to consider the order statistics associated with the types
of the other bidders. Let Y (N 1)1  Y1 be the highest of N   1 values, Y (N 1)2  Y2 be the
second-highest and so on. Also, let F1 and F2 be the distributions of Y1 and Y2 respectively,
with corresponding densities f1 and f2. Since the rst-period bidding function 1 is assumed to
be invertible, after the rst auction is over and its winning bid is revealed the valuation of the
winning bidder is commonly known to be y1 = 
 1
1 (p1). Thus, the second-period strategy can
be described as a function 2 :
h
0; 
i

h
0; 
i
! R+ so that a bidder with value  bids 2 (; y1)
if Y1 = y1. To nd an equilibrium that is sequentially rational, I start by looking at the bidders
problem in the second auction.
3.1 Second-period strategy
Consider a bidder with type  who plans to bid as if his type were e 6=  when all other N 2
remaining bidders follow the equilibrium strategy 2 (; y1). His expected payo¤ is
EU2
e; ; y1 = F2 ejy1 h   2 e; y1i (3)
+F2
ejy1  n(   0) h1  F2 ejy1io
+
h
1  F2
ejy1i n(0  )F2 ejy1o
where F2
ejy1 is the probability that Y2, the second highest valuation among N   1, is less
than e conditional on Y1 = y1 being the highest. The rst term on the right-hand-side of (3),
F2
ejy1 h   2 e; y1i, is standard expected consumption utility. The other terms capture
expected gain-loss utility and are derived as follows. A bidder of type  who bids as if his type
were e expects to win the auction with probability F2 ejy1 and if he wins he gets consumption
utility ; thus, winning the auction feels like a gain of  (   0) compared to the outcome of losing
the auction and getting 0, which the bidder expected to happen with probability
h
1  F2
ejy1i.
Similarly, with probability
h
1  F2
ejy1i the bidder loses the auction and gets 0; thus, losing
the auction feels like as loss of  (0  ) compared to the outcome of winning the auction and
getting , which the bidder expected to happen with probability F2
ejy1. Collapsing terms we
can re-write (3) as
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EU2
e; ; y1 = F2 ejy1 h   2 e; y1i  F2 ejy1 h1  F2 ejy1i
where    (  1) is the weight on expected gain-loss utility. Notice that expected gain-loss
utility is always negative as, since  > 1, losses are felt more heavily than equal-size gains.
Di¤erentiating EU2
e; ; y1 with respect to e yields the rst-order condition:
f2
ejy1 h1  2F2 ejy1i  = f2 ejy1    2 e; y1  02 e; y1F2 ejy1
where 02 is the derivative of 2 with respect to its rst argument.
Substituting  = e into the rst-order condition and re-arranging results in the following
di¤erential equation
@
@
f2 (; y1)F2 (jy1)g=f2 (jy1)  f1   [1  2F2 (jy1)]g (4)
together with the boundary condition that 2 (0; y1) = 0.
Because the di¤erent values are drawn independently, we have that
F2 (jy1) = F ()
N 2
F (y1)
N 2
and substituting into (4) yields
2 (; y1) =
Z 
0
x

1  

1  2 F (x)N 2
F (y1)
N 2

dF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
: (5)
The complete bidding strategy is to bid 2 (; y1) if  < y1 and to bid 

2 (y1; y1) if   y1.
The latter might occur if a bidder of type   y1 underbid in the rst period causing a lower
type to win (of course this is an o¤-equilibrium event).
The expression in (5) can be re-written as:
(1  )
Z 
0
xdF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
+ 
Z 
0
2x F (x)
N 2
F (y1)
N 2dF (x)
N 2
F ()N 2
:
Therefore, the bid under loss aversion is a convex combination of the risk-neutral bid and
a term that depends on the bidders expectations about how likely he is to win the auction
(reference point).
The rst thing worth noticing is that, even if bidders have independent private values, the
equilibrium bidding strategy in the second period is history-dependent, as it is a function of y1;
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with risk-neutral preferences ( = 0), instead, this is not the case:
RN2 () =
Z 
0
xdF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
:
Under risk neutrality, a bidder submits a bid equal to his estimation of the highest valuation of
his opponents, conditional on his own valuation being the highest. Because of this conditioning,
bids are independent of the prior history of the game. With reference-dependent preferences,
instead, the second-round equilibrium bid is decreasing in the rst-round price, as shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. (Discouragement E¤ect) If  > 0, then @

2(;y1)
@y1
< 0 8.
According to the result in Lemma 1, the higher is the type of the winner in the rst round,
the less aggressively the remaining bidders will bid in the second round. The rationale for this
negative e¤ect, which I call the discouragement e¤ect, is as follows. From the perspective of
a bidder who lost the rst auction, the higher is the type of the winner, the less likely this
bidder is to win in the second auction; with expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
a bidder who thinks that most likely he is not going to win does not feel a strong attachment
to the item and this pushes him to bid more conservatively. Thus, revealing the rst-period
winners bid (and hence his type) creates an informational externality. However, notice that the
e¤ect of this informational externality on the second-period bids is exactly the opposite of the
one that arises with interdependent (common) values. Indeed, with interdependent values the
higher is the type of the rst-round winner, the higher is the value of the object to all remaining
bidders who in turn bid more aggressively in the second auction. Therefore, by analyzing the
distribution of bids in the second auction, one can use the discouragement e¤ect to empirically
test the implications of loss aversion against the implications of the classical risk-neutral model
with either private values (where there is no history dependence) or with common values (where
the higher is the winning price in the rst auction, the more aggressively the remaining bidders
behave in the second auction).
Figure 1 displays the bidding strategy 2 (; y1) for two di¤erent values of y1 assuming 
U
[0; 1],  = 1
2
and N = 4: the dashed curve is for the case y1 = 12 while the solid one is for the
case y1 = 34 . As we would expect from Lemma 1, for   12 2

; 3
4

is always below 2

; 1
2

.
Furthermore, we have that
@2 (; y1)
@
=
Z 
0
x

2 F (x)
N 2
F (y1)
N 2   1

dF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
implying that there exists 0 < b (y1) <  such that @2(;y1)@ > 0 ,  > b (y1). In other words,
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Figure 1: The e¤ect of y1 on 

2 (; y1) for N = 4 and  =
1
2
with  distributed uniformly on [0; 1].
under loss aversion bidders with relatively high types overbid compared to the risk-neutral
benchmark whereas bidders with relatively low types underbid.
I end this section with an example where I compute the second-round bidding strategy
explicitly for the case of uniformly-distributed types.
Example 1. Suppose that  U [0; 1] and let y1 be the type of the winner in the rst round. Then,
in the second round the remaining bidders will play the following strategy:
2 (; y1) =
8<: (1  )

N 2
N 1

 + 

2N 4
2N 3

N 1
yN 21
if  < y1
(1  )

N 2
N 1

y1 + 

2N 4
2N 3

y1 if   y1
:
It is easy to see that, for  < y1, 

2 (; y1) is (i) increasing in , (ii) decreasing in y1 and
(iii) increasing in  if and only if  >

N 2
N 1
2N 3
2N 4
 1
N 2 y1.
3.2 First-period strategy
Consider a bidder with type  who plans to bid as if his type were e >  when all other N 1
bidders follow the strategy 1 ().10 Furthermore, suppose that all bidders expect to follow the
equilibrium strategy 2 (; y1) in the second auction, regardless of what happens in the rst one
(sequential rationality). The bidders expected total utility at the beginning of the rst round is
10The analysis is virtually identical for the case e < .
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EU1
e;  = F1 e h   1 ei+ Z e F2 (jy1) [   2 (; y1)] f1 (y1) dy1 (6)
 
"
F1
e+ Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
# "
1  F1
e  Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
#
where F1
e is the probability that Y1, the highest valuation among N   1, is less than e, and
F2 (jy1) and  are dened as before.
The rst line on the right-hand-side of (6) is the sum of expected consumption utilities
in periods 1 and 2. The second line captures expected gain-loss utility. Indeed, F1
e +Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1 is the sum of the probability with which a bidder of type  expects to win
the rst auction given that he pretends to be of type e and of his expectation, in the rst round,
of the probability of winning in the second round given that he pretends to be of type e in the
rst auction but expects to behave as his real type in the second one. Hence, in accordance with
the denition of SCPE in Section 2, a bidders reference point in the rst round is given by his
overall probability of consumption.
Di¤erentiating EU1
e; ; y1 with respect to e yields the following rst-order condition:
0 = f1
e h   1 ei  01 eF1 e  F2 je h   2 ; ei f1 e
 
h
f1
e  F2 je f1 ei
"
1  F1
e  Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
#
 
"
F1
e+ Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
# h
 f1
e+ F2 je f1 ei :
Substituting  = e and re-arranging results in the following di¤erential equation
d
d
f1 ()F1 ()g = f1 () 2 (; )
together with the boundary condition that 1 (0) = 0. Solving the di¤erential equation yields
1 () =
Z 
0
2 (s; s) f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
: (7)
The rst thing worth noticing is that the bidding function in (7) resembles the bidding
function in the classical reference-free model with interdependent values (see Milgrom andWeber,
2000 and Mezzetti, 2011). Furthermore, 1 () depends on  only indirectly, through 

2 (s; s).
Indeed, just like in the standard model with reference-free preferences, in the rst round a bidder
chooses his optimal bid by conditioning on himself having the highest type. This is because a
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small change in his bid only matters when the bidder wins or is close to winning.11 When
conditioning on having the highest type, however, a bidder expects that if he were to lose the
current auction, he would win the next one for sure and this is why expected gain-loss utility
does not directly appear into the rst-period bidding function. Finally, it is easy to check that
for  = 0 we get back to the risk-neutral benchmark:
RN1 () =
Z 
0
RN2 (s) f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
where RN2 (s) does not depend of the type of the winner of the rst auction.
Let y1 = 
 1
1 (p1). Then, the expected equilibrium price in the second auction conditional
on the price of the rst auction is
E [p2jp1] = E [p2j1 (y1)] = E
h
2

Y
(N 1)
1 ; y1

jY (N 1)1  y1
i
=
Z y1
0
2 (; y1) f1 () d
F1 (y1)
:
The following proposition delivers the rst main result of the paper.
Proposition 1. (Afternoon E¤ect) If  > 0, then the price sequence in a two-round sequential
rst-price auction is a supermartingale and the afternoon e¤ect arises in equilibrium. That is,
p1 = 

1 (y1) > E [p2j1 (y1)] = E [p2jp1] .
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that, just like in the reference-independent case, in
equilibrium bidders must be indi¤erent between winning in the rst auction or in the second one.
Hence, in the rst auction a bidder bids the expectation of the second-round price conditional
on himself having the highest type and being the price-setter. However, by conditioning his
rst-period bid on him having the highest type, a bidder expects not to feel discouraged in the
second auction. And because the discouragement e¤ect depresses bids in the second auction, the
expectation of the second-round price conditional on being the price-setter is higher than the
second-round expected price conditional on the rst-round price. In essence, optimal equilibrium
behavior leads the current price setter to overestimate the bid of his highest opponent and hence
the next-round price. Example 2 illustrates the afternoon e¤ect for the case of uniformly-
distributed types.
11If a bidder deviates from the symmetric equilibrium strategy by slightly overbidding, there are only two
possible consequences. First, if he was already going to win then he still wins, but pays a slightly higher price.
Second, his deviation might make him win the current round when he was otherwise going to lose. In the latter
case, however, it must be that the highest opposing type is so close that the bidder was almost certain to win in
the second round.
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Figure 2: E [p2jp1]   p1 as a function of y1 for three di¤erent values of  (0, 12 , 1) when N = 4
and  is distributed uniformly on [0; 1]
Example 2. Suppose that  U [0; 1]. The rst-round equilibrium bid and price are
1 () = (1  )

N   2
N

 + 

2N   4
2N   3

N   1
N


and
p1 = 

1 (y1) = (1  )

N   2
N

y1 + 

2N   4
2N   3

N   1
N

y1:
The conditional second-round expected price is
E [p2jp1] = E [p2j1 (y1)] = (1  )

N   2
N

y1 + 2

N   2
2N   3
2
y1:
Hence,
E [p2jp1]  p1 = 
"
2

N   2
2N   3
2
 

2N   4
2N   3

N   1
N
#
y1
and
E [p2jp1] < p1 , 2

N   2
2N   3
2
<

2N   4
2N   3

N   1
N

, N2   3N + 3 > 0:
In Figure 2 I plot the di¤erence E [p2jp1]  p1 as a function of y1 for three di¤erent values of
 when N = 4 and  is distributed uniformly on [0; 1]: i)  = 0 (solid), ii)  = 1
2
(dashed) and
iii)  = 1 (dotted). Two e¤ects are evident from the plot: 1) for a given value of y1, the higher
is  the stronger is the afternoon e¤ect and 2) for a xed strictly positive , the higher is y1 the
stronger is the afternoon e¤ect.
It is useful to compare the logic behind the afternoon e¤ect in my model with the learning
e¤ect that arises in common value-auctions with informational externalities. In the symmetric
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equilibrium of a common-value auction, a bidder conditions his estimate of the value of the
item (and hence his bid) on his strongest rival having a (weakly) lower signal than his. In
this case, since a bidder revise his estimate of the value of the good upward when losing the
rst auction, the equilibrium price sequence drifts upward. Conversely, with the informational
externalities that arise in a private-value auction with expectations-based loss aversion, when
losing the rst auction a bidder becomes more pessimistic about how likely he is to win the second
one (compared to his rst-round expectations); this creates a discouragement e¤ect that pushes
bidders to behave less aggressively and, in turn, generates a declining price path in equilibrium.
4 Second-Price Auctions
In this section I assume that two identical items are sold using a sequence of second-price
sealed-bid auctions. I continue to focus on symmetric strategies (b1; b2) that are strictly increas-
ing and to assume that the winning bid of the rst round is publicly disclosed by the seller prior
to the second one.12 I begin by analyzing the bidders problem in the second round.
4.1 Second-period strategy
Fixing the bidding strategies of the other players, let  (b2jy1) denote the probability with
which a bidder of type  expects to win with a bid equal to b2 conditional on y1 being the type
of the rst-round winner. The payment he has to make if he wins the auction is given by the
second largest bid and follows the distribution  (jy1). Then, the bidders expected utility is
EU2 (b2; ; y1) =
Z b2
0
(   p) d (pjy1)   (b2jy1) [1   (b2jy1)] (8)
Di¤erentiating (8) with respect to b2 yields the rst-order condition:
   b2    [1  2 (b2jy1)] = 0:
In a symmetric equilibrium,  (b2jy1) = F2 (jy1) and hence we obtain:
b2 (; y1) = 
(
1  
"
1  2 F ()
N 2
F (y1)
N 2
#)
.
While it is well known that without loss aversion ( = 0) in a symmetric equilibrium a bidder
submits a bid equal to his own valuation, the above expression shows that this is not the case
12Notice that in a second-price auction the winning bid is not the price the winner actually ends up paying.
This an important point because if the seller were to reveal the winning price of the rst auction, then the bidders
would infer the type of the highest remaining bidder and a symmetric equilibrium in monotone strategies would
fail to exist.
15
with reference-dependent preferences. Indeed, we have
@b2 (; y1)
@
=
"
2
F ()N 2
F (y1)
N 2   1
#
 > 0, F ()
F (y1)
>

1
2
 1
N 2
:
Therefore, higher (lower) types bid higher (lower) than their valuation. Furthermore, as for
rst-price auctions, we have the following result.
Lemma 2. (Discouragement E¤ect II) If  > 0, then @b

2(;y1)
@y1
< 0 8.
The intuition is like in Lemma 1: the higher the type of the winner in the rst auction, the
less likely a remaining bidder is to win in the second one and, therefore, he bids less aggressively.
4.2 First-period strategy
As shown by Lange and Ratan (2010) for the case of single-unit auctions, if bidders are not
loss-averse over money, rst-price and second-price auctions are revenue equivalent. The reason
is that, when bidders are risk-neutral over money expected gain-loss utility depends only on the
probability with which a bidder expects to win the auction and this is the same in both formats.
It is easy to see that the same intuition applies also to multi-unit auctions. Hence, we can use
the revenue equivalence theorem to derive the rst-round equilibrium bidding function.
In the rst auction a type- bidder wins with probability F1 () and, if he wins, the price he
pays is b1 (y1), the highest among his rivalsbids. Thus, his expected rst-round payment is
F1 ()
Z 
0
b1 (y1) f1 (y1j) dy1:
In a rst-price auction, instead, the winning bidder pays his own bid and therefore his
expected payment in the rst round is:
F1 () 

1 () = F1 ()
26664
Z 
0
2 (s; s) f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
37775
where the equality follows from (7). From revenue equivalence it follows that
Z 
0
b1 (y1) f1 (y1j) dy1 =
Z 
0
2 (s; s) f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
and di¤erentiating both sides of the equality with respect to  yields
b1 () = 

2 (; ) .
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Therefore, the equilibrium bid in the rst of two sequential second-price auctions is equal
to the second rounds bid of two sequential rst-price auction where, in the latter, the bidder
conditions his bid on himself having the highest type. Finally, notice that the afternoon e¤ect
arises in equilibrium since, by revenue equivalence, in each round the sellers expected revenue
from a second-price auction is equal to the expected revenue from a rst-price auction.
5 Sequential vs. Simultaneous Auctions
In this section I focus on simultaneous auctions; that is, auctions in which all the items are
allocated after only one round of bidding. I derive the equilibrium bidding strategy in a two-unit
discriminatory (pay-your-bid) auction. In a discriminatory auction, bidders submit sealed bids
and the highest bidders each receive one object and each pays his own bid. This procedure
generalizes the single-object rst-price auction, and is the procedure most commonly used for
the sale of U.S. Treasury bills.13 As before, I continue to look for an equilibrium in symmetric
monotone strategies.
Consider a bidder with type  who plans to bid as if his type were e 6=  when all other N 1
bidders follow the strategy  (). His expected utility is
EU

; e = F2 e h    ei  F2 e h1  F2 ei (9)
where F2
e  F1 e + (N   1) h1  F eiF eN 2 is the probability that Y2, the second
highest valuation among N   1, is less than e and  is dened as before. Notice that it is not
necessary for a bidder to outbid all his competitors in order to be awarded an object; it is enough
to outbid N   2 of them.
Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to e yields the rst-order condition:
0 = f2
e h    ei  0 eF2 e  f2 e h1  2F2 ei :
Then, substituting  = e into the FOC and re-arranging results in the following di¤erential
equation
d
d
f ()F2 ()g = f2 ()  f1   [1  2F2 ()]g
13An alternative procedure is the uniform-price auction. In a uniform-price auction, the bidders submit sealed
bids and the winning bidders all pay the same price, equal to the highest rejected bid. This procedure generalizes
the single-object second-price auction. The analysis for the uniform-price auction is virtually identical and hence
omitted.
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together with the boundary condition that  (0) = 0. Solving the di¤erential equation yields
 () =
Z 
0
s f1   [1  2F2 (s)]g f2 (s) ds
F2 ()
:
Again, the equilibrium bidding function can be re-written as a convex combination of the
risk-neutral bid and a term that depends on the bidders expectations (reference point):
 () = (1  )
Z 
0
sf2 (s) ds
F2 ()
+ 
Z 
0
2sF2 (s) f2 (s) ds
F2 ()
:
Now I compare the biddersequilibrium utility and the sellers expected revenue under simul-
taneous and sequential auctions. I do the comparison for rst-price (sequential) auctions and
discriminatory (simultaneous) auctions, but the same results apply for second-price (sequential)
and uniform-price (simultaneous) auctions by revenue equivalence.
Let V sim () and V seq () denote a bidders expected utility in equilibrium in a simultaneous
and sequential auction, respectively. With independent private values and under risk neutrality
( = 0), it is well known that a bidders equilibrium expected utility in a simultaneous auction
is the same as in a sequential auction. Under loss aversion, instead, we have:
Proposition 2. (Bidder-payo¤ Equivalence) If  > 0, then V seq ()  V sim () if and only if
Z 
0
F2 (s) sf2 (s) ds 
Z 
0
Z x
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx+
Z 

Z 
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx:
It is easy to see that the inequality in Proposition 2 cannot bind for every type unless
F2 (s) = F2 (sjx) implying that, generically, sequential auctions and simultaneous ones are not
bidder-payo¤ equivalent. Notice also that a bidders ex-ante probability of obtaining an item
is the same under both formats and this implies, trivially, that a bidders expected gain-loss
utility is also the same under both formats. Hence, the di¤erence between V seq () and V sim ()
is simply given by the di¤erence in the expected payments. Indeed, recall that with risk-neutral
bidders the condition in Proposition 2 is
F2 ()
"R 
0 sf2 (s) ds
F2 ()
#
 F1 ()
"R 
0
R x
0 sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx
F1 ()
#
+
Z 

Z 
0
sf2 (sjx) ds
F2 (jx) F2 (jx) f1 (x) dx
which always binds since both sides are simply equal to Pr [Y2  ]  E [Y2jY2  ]. With
reference-dependent preferences, however, the expected payments in the two formats depend
also on the bidders beliefs about how likely he is to win (represented by the additional cdf term
under the integral) since these determine his reference point.
Figure 3 shows how V seq ()  V sim () varies with  for ve di¤erent values of N (3, 4, 5, 10
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Figure 3: V seq ()  V sim () for N = 3; 4; 5; 10 and 20 with  distributed uniformly on [0; 1].
and 20) when the bidderstypes are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] (a darker color corresponds
to a higher value for N). For a given N there exists a cuto¤ type  who is indi¤erent between
the two formats. Furthermore, the value of the cuto¤  is increasing in N .
According to Figure 3, low-type bidders prefer simultaneous auctions whereas high-type
ones prefer sequential ones. The intuition for these opposing preferences is reminiscent of the
result in Köszegi and Rabin (2009) about a loss-averse decision makers dislike of interim partial
information because it exposes her to possibly unnecessary bad news due to uctuations in
beliefs. More precisely, Köszegi and Rabin (2009) consider an example with two equiprobable
possible consumption levels, c 2 f0; 1g and an expectations-based loss-averse agent who has
access to a signal & 2 f0; 1g, where the signal is accurate (& = c) with probability w > 1
2
. They
show that unless w = 1, the agent prefers not to receive the signal. In an auction, however,
a bidders expected consumption depends on his type and higher types are more likely to win.
Hence, during the course of a sequential auction higher types are more likely to receive good
news (and be less discouraged) whereas lower types are more likely to receive bad news (and be
more discouraged). Therefore, bidders with higher types prefer sequential auctions while bidders
with lower types prefer simultaneous ones.
Next I compare the sellers expected revenue between the two formats. It is now convenient
to take the point of view of the seller and consider the order statistics of the values of all N
bidders. Let Z(N)1  Z1 be the highest of N values, Z(N)2  Z2 be the second-highest and so on.
Also, letM1 andM2 be the distributions of Z1 and Z2 respectively, with corresponding densities
m1 and m2. Under risk neutrality ( = 0), the two auction formats are revenue-equivalent, both
yielding an expected revenue equal to 2E [Z3] (Milgrom and Weber, 2000). Under loss aversion,
instead, we have:
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Proposition 3. (Revenue Equivalence) If  > 0, then E [Rsim]  E [Rseq] if and only if
Z 
0
Z 
0
F2 (s) sf2 (s)
F2 ()
ds [m1 () +m2 ()] d 
Z 
0
Z 
0
Z x
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx)
F1 ()
dsf1 (x) dxm1 () d +Z 
0
Z x
0
Z 
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx)
F2 (jx) ds
f1 ()
F1 (x)
dm1 (x) dx:
As for the previous result about bidder-payo¤ equivalence, it is easy to see that the condition
in Proposition 3 cannot bind for every N unless F2 (s) = F2 (sjx), in which case both sides reduce
to 2E [Z3]. Therefore, which format yields a higher revenue depends on the number of bidders.
Sequential auctions yield a higher revenue when the number of bidders is relatively high. For
example, straightforward calculations show that with two objects if  U [0; 1], simultaneous
auctions yield a higher expected revenue than sequential ones for N = 3 whereas for N = 4
the two formats yield the same expected revenue. For N  5 sequential auctions yield a higher
expected revenue than simultaneous ones.
Gathering together the results from this section and the previous ones, we obtain the following
corollary:
Corollary 1. (Comparison of Di¤erent Auction Formats) If  > 0, revenue equivalence holds
within formats but not between. That is, sequential rst-price auctions are revenue-equivalent to
sequential second-price auctions and discriminatory auctions are revenue-equivalent to uniform-
price auctions. However, sequential rst-price auctions are not revenue-equivalent to discrimi-
natory auctions and sequential-second price auctions are not revenue-equivalent to uniform-price
auctions.
Recall that in equilibrium a bidders expected probability of consumption and expected gain-
loss utility are the same under all four types of auctions considered in this paper. Thus, the
non-equivalence result in Corollary 1 is due to the e¤ect that sequential (partial) information
revelation has on the expected payments of a loss-averse bidder.
6 Sequential Auctions without Announcements of the
Winning Bid
In the classical reference-free model with independent private values, the optimal bidding
strategy does not depend on the (public) history of the winning bids.14 However, this is no
longer the case with expectations-based reference-dependent preferences. Hence, some questions
naturally arise: Is equilibrium bidding di¤erent if the seller commits to not revealing the history
14This also implies, trivially, that the equilibrium is exactly the same with and without price announcement.
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of winning bids? Does the rationale for the afternoon e¤ect with expectations-based reference-
dependent preferences rely on the history of winning bids being publicly available? And, nally,
would the seller be better o¤ by not disclosing the history of winning bids? I answer these
questions in the context of sequential rst-price auctions.
6.1 Second-period strategy
Consider a bidder of type  who plans to bid as if his type were e 6=  when all other N   2
remaining bidders follow the strategy 2. Let  be the type that the bidder pretended to be
in the rst auction. If he lost the rst auction, he knows that y1 > . Then his expected
second-round payo¤ is
EU2
e; ; = ' ()F eN 2 h   2 e; i  ' ()F eN 2 1  ' ()F eN 2 (10)
where ' () = (N 1)[1 F ()]
1 F ()N 1 . Thus, ' ()F
eN 2 denotes the probability that the second
highest of N   1 draws is below e given that the highest is above ; or, in other words, the
probability that a bidder who pretends to be of type e in the second auction wins this auction
given that he pretended to be of type  in the rst auction and lost it.15 Notice that, crucially,
the second-round bid might, in principle, depend also on .
As rst conjectured by Milgrom and Weber (2000) and later shown by Mezzetti et al. (2008),
with no bid announcement and a¢ liated values it is optimal for a bidder of type  to behave
according to his type in the second auction if and only if he behaved as type    in the rst
auction. By contrast, if a bidder of type  behaves as if his type were higher than  in the rst
auction, he might want to over-bid in the second auction as well. This happens because, as
Milgrom and Weber (2000) pointed out, a bidder might choose a bid a bit higher in the rst
round in order to have a better estimate of the winning bid, should he lose. Recall that, with
interdependent values, a better estimate of the winning bid is also a better estimate of the value
of the object for sale. In our case, however, values are private and independent; therefore, it is
optimal for a bidder in the second auction to bid according to his true type, no matter what he
did in the rst one.
15Technically, we have that
(N   1) [1  F ()]F
eN 2
1  F ()N 1
=
R 

Re
0
h (y1; y2) dy2dy1R 

R ey1
0
h (ey1; ey2) dey2dey1
where h (y1; y2) = (N   1) (N   2) f (y1) f (y2)F (y2)N 3 is the joint density of Y1 and Y2.
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Di¤erentiating EU2
e; ; with respect to e yields the rst-order condition:
0 =  (N   2)F
eN 3 f e   (N   2)F eN 3 f e 1  2' ()F eN 2
 
@2
e; 
@e F
eN 2   2 e;  (N   2)F eN 3 f e :
Hence, ' () enters the FOC only through the reference point, but it does not a¤ect the
directpart of a bidders payo¤ and since   1 the directpart carries a higher weight than
the reference-dependent part. Substituting  = e into the FOC and re-arranging results in the
following di¤erential equation
@
@
n
2 (; )F ()
N 2o =  n1   h1  2' ()F ()N 2io (N   2)F ()N 3 f ()
together with the boundary condition that 2 (0; ) = 0. Thus, the equilibrium bidding function
is
b2 (; ) =
Z 
0
x

1  

1  2(N 1)(1 F ())F (x)N 2
1 F ()N 1

dF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
:
The equilibrium bidding strategy is a function of the type that the bidder mimicked in the
previous auction since, if the seller does not publicly reveal the rst-round winning bid, a bidder
who lost the rst auction must use his own bid from the previous round in order to infer where he
stands in the ranking of the remaining biddersvalues. Hence, the equilibrium strategy depends
on the (private) history of the game and, as the following lemma shows, a slightly di¤erent form
of discouragement e¤ect arises in equilibrium.
Lemma 3. (Discouragement E¤ect III) If  > 0, then @b2(;)
@
< 0 8.
The intuition for this result slightly di¤ers from the one behind Lemmas 1 and 2. When
the winning bid from the rst auction is not publicly revealed, a bidder can only use his own
rst-round bid to formulate an expectation about how likely he is to win in the second one.
The higher the type he pretended to be in the rst auction, the less likely he feels to win in
the current one since not winning the rst auction, given that he pretended to have a high
type, is bad news about how erce competition is. This, in turn, implies that the higher is the
type a bidder pretended to be in the rst auction, the less aggressive his bidding will be in the
second auction. Recall that when the seller announces the winning bid after the rst auction,
the equilibrium bid in the second auction is:
2 (; y1) =
Z 
0
x

1  

1  2

F (x)
F (y1)
N 2
dF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
:
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Comparing the second-round equilibrium strategies with and without bid announcement yield
the following result.
Lemma 4. (E¤ect of information I) Equilibrium bidding in the second auction is more aggressive
when the seller does not reveal the winning bid of the rst auction if and only if
(N   1) [1  F ()]
1  F ()N 1 >
1
F (y1)
N 2 : (11)
First, notice that condition (11) can hold only if y1 > . The term on the left-hand-side of
(11) represents what a bidder learns from losing in the rst round about how erce competition
is in the second round: he knows that the rst-round winners type is above . Similarly, the
term on the right-hand-side of (11) represents what a bidder learns from losing in the rst round
about how erce competition is in the second round: he knows that all remaining bidderstypes
are below y1. Hence, with no bid announcement, bidders are asymmetrically informed about the
intensity of competition in the second round whereas with bid announcement they all have the
same information. It is easy to see that the right-hand-side of condition (11) is decreasing in y1
implying that, for a xed , the higher is the type of the winner in the rst auction, the more
aggressive second-round bidding behavior is when the winning bid is not revealed. Similarly,
the left-hand-side of condition (11) is decreasing in  implying that, for a xed y1 a bidder who
pretended to be a low type in the rst auction behaves more aggressively in the second one when
the winning bid is not revealed. Of course, as I am about to show next, in equilibrium a bidder
will behave according to his type in both auctions so that  = .
6.2 First-period strategy
Consider a bidder of type  who plans to bid as if his type were e >  when all other
N  1 bidders follow the strategy 1.16 Suppose that all bidders expect to follow the equilibrium
strategy b2 in the second auction. Then, the bidder will solve the following problem:
EU1
e;  = F1 e h   1 ei+ Z e F2 (jy1)
h
   b2 ; ei f1 (y1) dy1
 
"
F1
e+ Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
# "
1  F1
e  Z e F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
#
16The analysis is virtually identical for the case e < .
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Di¤erentiating EU1
e;  with respect to e yields the following rst-order-condition:
0 = f1
e h   1 ei   01 eF1 e
  (N   1) f
eF ()N 2 h   2 ; ei  @2

; e
@e (N   1)
h
1  F
eiF ()N 2 :
Substituting  = e and re-arranging results in the following di¤erential equation
f1 () 2 (; )  (N   1) [1  F ()]F ()N 2
@2

; e
@e
e= =
d
d
f1 ()F1 ()g (12)
together with the boundary condition that 1 (0) = 0. Notice that, crucially,
@2(;e)
@e 6= 0. That
is, by mimicking another type in the rst auction, a bidder is not just a¤ecting the probability of
getting to the second auction  like in the classical reference-free model  but he is also a¤ecting
his own future bid in the second auction. This occurs because, with no bid announcement
between auctions, a players bid in the current round a¤ects his reference point in the next one.
Solving the di¤erential equation in (12) yields
b1 () =
Z 
0
b2 (s; s) f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
 
Z 
0

@b2(s;e)
@e
e=s 1 F (s)f(s)

f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
: (13)
Notice that
@b2 ; e
@e =  
2 (N   1) f
e h1  F2 ei Z 
0
xF (x)N 2 dF (x)N 2
1  F
eN 12 F ()N 2 < 0
where F2
e = F eN 1 + (N   1) h1  F eiF eN 2.
The following lemma shows that, compared to the case analyzed in Section 3, bidders behave
less aggressively in the rst auction when the seller commits to not revealing the winning bid.
Lemma 5. (E¤ect of information II) Equilibrium bidding in the rst round is more aggressive
when the seller commits to publicly reveal the winning bid prior to the second round; that is,
1 ()  b1 ()  0 8 and the inequality is strict if  < .
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is the following. When anticipating that the seller will not
reveal the winning bid of the rst auction prior to the second one, a bidder knows that his bid
in the rst auction  in case he does not win will determine his reference point in the second
one. A high bid in the rst auction, hence, implies also a high reference point in the second
auction. Having a high reference point in the second auction, however, exposes the bidder to
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a greater disappointment in case he were to lose the second auction as well. Therefore, if the
seller commits to not revealing the rst-round winning price, bidders bid less aggressively in the
rst auction. Furthermore, the sellers total expected revenue is higher when she commits to
revealing the rst rounds winning bid.
Proposition 4. (Revenue) The sellers expected revenue is higher when she commits to disclose
the winning bid from the rst auction prior to the second one.
From an ex-ante perspective, bidders going into the second round without knowing the type of
the winner in the rst round are exposed to much more uncertainty about competition compared
to bidders who know the type of the rst-round winner. Indeed, in the latter case every bidder
going into the second auction knows that all of his competitorstypes are below a certain cuto¤
type while in the former a bidder only knows that the winner has a higher type than his. An
expectations-based loss-averse bidder dislikes uncertainty in his consumption outcomes because
he dislikes the possibility of a resulting loss more than he likes the possibility of a resulting
gain (so he is rst-orderrisk averse; see Köszegi and Rabin, 2007). As auctions without bid
announcements expose bidders to greater risk, they react by bidding less aggressively. Therefore,
compared to the analysis in Section 3, if the seller does not reveal the winning bid of the rst
auction prior to the second one, her expected revenue decreases.17
Mezzetti et al. (2008) show that, under the assumption of a¢ liated private values, the sellers
expected revenue in a sequential auction with winning-bid announcement is the same as in a
sequential auction with no bid announcement, and is lower than in a simultaneous auction. By
contrast, if bidders have independent private values and expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences, sequential auctions with winning-bid announcement always yield a higher revenue
than sequential auctions with no bid announcement (Proposition 4) and might yield a higher
revenue than simultaneous auctions (Proposition 3).
The following proposition shows that even with no bid announcement, however, the afternoon
e¤ect still arises in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. (Afternoon E¤ect II) If  > 0, then the price sequence in a two-round rst-
price auction without bid announcement is a supermartingale and the afternoon e¤ect arises in
equilibrium. That is,
p1 = b1 (y1) > E hp2jb1 (y1)i = E [p2jp1] .
Like in Section 3 in equilibrium prices decline because of the discouragement e¤ect, but the
intuition is slightly di¤erent. When the seller commits to not disclosing the winning bid, in
the rst round bidders are willing to pay a positive premium  equal to the second term on
17This result is akin to the famous Linkage Principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982): auctioneers have an
incentive to pre-commit to revealing all available information.
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the right-hand-side of (13)  in order to avoid having to go to the second round and being
discouraged.
Summing up, with expectations-based reference-dependent preferences the equilibrium bid-
ding strategy changes depending on whether the seller commits to publicly reveal the winning
bids from the previous rounds. With winning-bid announcement rst-round bids are always
higher whereas bids in the second round can be higher or lower than without bid announcement.
Furthermore, the sellers expected revenue is higher when she commits to disclose the previous
rounds winning bid. In either case, however, equilibrium prices follow a declining path.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I have proposed a novel, preference-based explanation for the afternoon ef-
fect observed in sequential auctions by positing that bidders are expectations-based loss-averse.
My explanation based on loss aversion has the advantage of applying very generally, without
requiring any additional modication of the auction environment. This is important since, as
the evidence suggests, declining prices have been found in many di¤erent settings, even with no
option to buy additional units and with identical objects.
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences create an informational externality, the
discouragement e¤ect, that renders the equilibrium strategy history-dependent: the higher is
the type of the winner in the rst auction, the less aggressively the remaining bidders will bid
in the second one. The e¤ect of this informational externality on the second-round bids is the
opposite of the one that arises in models with common values where the higher is the signal of
the rst-round winner, the higher is the estimated value of the object for all remaining bidders
who in turn bid more aggressively. Therefore, by looking at the distribution of bids in the
second auction, one can use the discouragement e¤ect to empirically test the implications of loss
aversion against the implications of the classical model with either private values (no history
dependence) or common values (the higher the winning price in the rst auction, the more
aggressively bidders behave in the second auction).
In equilibrium a bidder must be indi¤erent between winning in the rst auction or in the
second one. Hence, in the rst auction he chooses the optimal bid conditional on having the
highest type and being the price-setter. By conditioning his bid in the rst auction on having
the highest type, however, a bidder expects not to feel discouraged in the second auction. Thus,
in equilibrium bidders bid more aggressively in the rst auction and prices decline.
In addition to rationalizing the afternoon e¤ect, loss aversion delivers new testable impli-
cations that are of independent interest. For example, when bidders are expectations-based
loss-averse simultaneous and sequential auctions are not revenue-equivalent nor bidder-payo¤
equivalent. Furthermore, in sequential auctions the seller always achieves a higher expected
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revenue by committing to reveal the previous rounds winning bid.
Despite being able to explain the afternoon e¤ect and to generate new testable predictions,
there are several dimensions along which the model could be improved. First, I have departed
from the original model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences of Köszegi and
Rabin (2006) by assuming that bidders are loss-averse only over consumption, but not over
money. Admittedly restrictive, however, this assumption considerably simplies the analysis.
For example, with loss aversion over money rst-price and second-price auctions are not revenue-
equivalent anymore and the analysis of the second-price auction becomes much more intricate.
Furthermore, in some of the auctions discussed in the Introduction the goods up for sale are
not sought after by the bidders for their consumption value, but rather for commercial purposes
(i.e., a production or a resale motive). In this case what bidders care about is the monetary
value of the goods and a model of reference-dependent preferences where gains and losses are
evaluated with respect to the overall gains from trade (   p) might be more appropriate.
There are several interesting directions for future research. One would be to study sequential
dynamic (open) auctions, like English and Dutch auctions. If bidders are risk-neutral and have
independent private values, it is well-known that the English (resp. Dutch) auction is strate-
gically equivalent to the second-price (resp. rst-price) sealed-bid auction. This equivalence,
however, is unlikely to hold when bidders are expectations-based loss-averse.18
Another interesting extension would be to analyze a model where loss-averse bidders have
interdependent values. Mezzetti (2011) showed that the informational externality arising from
the interdependence between the biddersvalues generates an increasing price sequence. The
current paper argues that expectations-based loss aversion also creates an informational exter-
nality which, however, pushes prices to decline. Which e¤ect will dominate would likely depend
on the strength of loss aversion as well as on how sensitive a bidders value is to his rivalssignals.
18See Ehrhart and Ott (2014) for a rst analysis of single-object dynamic auctions with expectations-based
loss-averse bidders.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: We have
@2 (; y1)
@y1
=  
2 (N   2)2 F (y1)N 3 f (y1)
Z 
0
xF (x)2N 5 f (x) dx
[F (y1)F ()]
2(N 2)
< 0: 
Proof of Proposition 1: We have
1 (y1) =
Z y1
0
2 (; ) f1 () d
F1 (y1)
>
Z y1
0
2 (; y1) f1 () d
F1 (y1)
= E [p2jp1]
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2: We have
@b2 (; y1)
@y1
=  2 (N   2) F ()
N 2
F (y1)
N 1
< 0: 
Proof of Proposition 2: We have that
V sim () = F2 () [    ()]  F2 () [1  F2 ()]
and
V seq () = F1 () [   1 ()] +
Z 

F2 (jy1) [   2 (; y1)] f1 (y1) dy1
 
"
F1 () +
Z 

F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
# "
1  F1 () 
Z 

F2 (jy1) f1 (y1) dy1
#
:
Hence,
V seq ()  V sim () = F2 ()  ()  F1 () 1 () 
Z 

F2 (jy1) 2 (; y1) f1 (y1) dy1
= (1  )
Z 
0
sf2 (s) ds+ 
Z 
0
2F2 (s) sf2 (s) ds
  (1  )
Z 
0
Z x
0
sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx  
Z 
0
Z x
0
2F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx
  (1  )
Z 

Z 
0
sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx  
Z 

Z 
0
2F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx:
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Notice that
Z 
0
sf2 (s) ds =
Z 
0
Z x
0
sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx+
Z 

Z 
0
sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx
implying that
V seq ()  V sim ()  0 ,Z 
0
F2 (s) sf 2 (s) ds 
Z 
0
Z x
0
F2 (sjx) sf 2 (sjx) dsf 1 (x) dx+
Z 

Z 
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx) dsf1 (x) dx
and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3: We have that
E [Rseq] =
Z 
0
1 ()m1 () d +
Z 
0
Z x
0
2 (; x) f1 ()
F1 (x)
dm1 (x) dx
and
E
h
Rsim
i
=
Z 
0
 () [m1 () +m2 ()] d:
Hence,
E [Rsim]  E [Rseq] =
Z 
0
26664
(1  )
Z 
0
sf2 (s) ds+ 
Z 
0
2F2 (s) sf2 (s) ds
F2 ()
37775 [m1 () +m2 ()] d
 
Z 
0
26664
(1  )
Z 
0
Z x
0
sf 2 (sjx) dsf 1 (x) dx+ 
Z 
0
Z x
0
2F 2 (sjx) sf 2 (sjx) dxf 1 (x) dx
F1 ()
37775m1 () d
 
Z 
0
26664
(1  )
Z x
0
Z 
0
sf2(sjx)
F2(jx) dsf 1 () d + 
Z x
0
Z 
0
2F 2 (sjx) sf2(sjx)F2(jx) dsf 1 () d
F1 (x)
37775m1 (x) dx:
Notice that
Z 
0
Z 
0
sf2 (s)
F2 ()
ds [m1 () +m2 ()] d =
Z 
0
Z 
0
Z x
0
sf2 (sjx)
F1 ()
dsf1 (x) dxm1 () d
+
Z 
0
Z x
0
Z 
0
sf2 (sjx)
F2 (jx) ds
f1 ()
F1 (x)
dm1 (x) dx
implying that
E
h
Rsim
i
  E [Rseq]  0 ,
29
Z 
0
Z 
0
F2 (s) sf2 (s)
F2 ()
ds [m1 () +m2 ()] d 
Z 
0
Z 
0
Z x
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx)
F1 ()
dsf1 (x) dxm1 () d
+
Z 
0
Z x
0
Z 
0
F2 (sjx) sf2 (sjx)
F2 (jx) ds
f1 ()
F1 (x)
dm1 (x) dx
and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3: We have
@b2 (; )
@
=  
2 (N   1) f () [1  F2 ()]
Z 
0
xF (x)N 2 dF (x)N 2h
1  F ()N 1
i2
F ()N 2
< 0
where F2 () = F ()
N 1 + (N   1) [1  F ()]F ()N 2 : 
Proof of Lemma 4: Immediate by inspection. 
Proof of Lemma 5: We have
1 ()  b1 () =
Z 
0

2 (s; s)  b2 (s; s) + @b2(s;e)@e
e=s 1 F (s)f(s)

f1 (s) ds
F1 ()
:
A su¢ cient condition for the above expression to be non-negative is
2 (s; s)  b2 (s; s)    @b2

s; e
@e
e=s
1  F (s)
f (s)
,
2

1
F (s)N 2
  (N 1)[1 F (s)]
1 F (s)N 1
 Z s
0
xF (x)N 2 dF (x)N 2
F (s)N 2

2 (N   1) [1  F (s)] [1  F2 (s)]
Z s
0
xF (x)N 2 dF (x)N 2h
1  F (s)N 1
i2
F (s)N 2
, 1
F (s)N 2
  (N   1) [1  F (s)]
1  F (s)N 1 
(N   1) [1  F (s)] [1  F2 (s)]h
1  F (s)N 1
i2 :
, 1  F2 (s)
(N   1) [1  F (s)]F (s)N 2 
1  F2 (s)
1  F (s)N 1
, 1  F2 (s)
and this concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4: We know from Lemma 5 that rst-round bidding is more aggressive
with price announcement and this implies, trivially, that the rst-round expected revenue is
higher with price announcement. Hence, it su¢ ces to show that the second-round expected
revenue is also higher with price announcement; that is:
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Z 
0
Z y1
0
2 (; y1) f1 () d
F1 (y1)
m1 (y1) dy1 
Z 
0
b2 (; )m2 () d:
Substituting and re-arranging yields:
(1  )
Z 
0
Z y1
0
X () f1 () d
F1 (y1)
m1 (y1) dy1 + 
Z 
0
Z y1
0
2cX () f1 () d
F (y1)
N 2 F1 (y1)
m1 (y1) dy1 
(1  )
Z 
0
X ()m2 () d + 
Z 
0
2 (N   1) [1  F ()]
1  F ()N 1
cX ()m2 () d
where X () =
Z 
0
xdF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
and cX () =
Z 
0
xF (x)N 2dF (x)N 2
F ()N 2
.
Notice that Z 
0
Z y1
0
X () f1 () d
F1 (y1)
m1 (y1) dy1 =
Z 
0
X ()m2 () d
which further implies that
Z 
0
Z y1
0
cX () f1 () d
F1 (y1)| {z }

(y1)
m1 (y1) dy1 =
Z 
0
cX ()m2 () d:
The result then follows since
Z 
0
2
 (y1)
F (y1)
N 2m1 (y1) dy1 
Z 
0
2 (N   1) [1  F ()]
1  F ()N 1
cX ()m2 () d
as
1
F (s)N 2
 (N   1) [1  F (s)]
1  F (s)N 1 , 1  F2 (s)
which holds 8s 2
h
0; 
i
. 
Proof of Proposition 5: We have
b1 (y1) =
Z y1
0
b2 (; ) f1 () d
F1 (y1)
 
Z y1
0

@b2(;e)
@e
e= 1 F ()f()

f1 () d
F1 (y1)
>
Z y1
0
b2 (; ) f1 () d
F1 (y1)
= E [p2jp1]
where the inequality follows from Lemma 3. 
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